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ABSTRACT: Quentin Meillassoux has sparked new debates within contemporary philosophy. 
One of his suggestions is that the principle of sufficient reason leads to an infinite regress, unless 
the ontological argument uncovers a reason that accounts for everything. Graham Harman has 
indicated that the infinite regress of sufficient reasons that Meillassoux refers to does not 
necessarily lead to an an absurdity. A similar claim has been made by the proponents of 
infinitism for the infinite regress of propositions. It can be shown that the principle of sufficient 
reason does not need to be abandoned, and it is not necessary to accept the ontological 
argument either. Furthermore, the infinite regress of orders of facticity that Meillassoux refers 
to does not lead to an absurdity. Instead, it suggests that facticity is not necessarily absolute. 
The consequence of this last point is that one does not need to accept the concept of the hyper-
Chaos either. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The publication of Quentin Meillassoux's first book, After Finitude1, has sparked new 
debates within contemporary philosophy in general, and continental philosophy in 
particular. The concise and clear argumentative style of his work, together with the 
elaboration of some of the most novel thesis that have been proposed in recent times, 
                                                          
1 Quentin Meillassoux, After finitude: An essay on the necessity of contingency. Trans. By Ray Brassier. London, 
Continuum, 2008. 
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make the reading of his book an unforgettable experience. Here we will examine an 
unexplored possibility that his unique thought permits, one that we hope will stimulate 
further debates about his work.  
As the reader will recall, Meillassoux claims that causality is not necessary. If the 
reader is in doubt about this, Meillassoux suggests the following analogy: non-
Euclidean geometries were developed by supposing that the negation of Euclid's fifth 
postulate would lead to a contradiction, but surprisingly it didn't. Meillassoux asks the 
reader to suppose that causality is not necessary, in order to see what consequences can 
be deduced from that premise. He says that the reader will not arrive at a 
contradiction, and may even develop an entirely new philosophy from that starting 
point. For our part, instead of supposing that causality is not necessary, we wish to 
make another supposition, in order to see what follows from it. Our supposition is that 
the infinite regress that the principle of sufficient reason seems to produce does not lead 
to an absurdity. Later we will see that one of the consequences of this supposition is 
that the principle of sufficient reason does not need to be abandoned. 
This possibility is not new, since it has already been suggested by Harman2. 
Harman proposes an interpretative procedure which he calls “hyperbolic reading”. He 
defines “hyperbolic reading” as a method which consists in assuming, for the sake of 
argument, that the philosopher to be analyzed has produced a work of such 
outstanding quality, that the interpreter agrees with the overwhelming majority of the 
work's claims. Once this is conceded, Harman indicates, it is possible to ask oneself the 
following question: Is there something that the interpreter can add to this work, as 
minimal as it may be? Applying this procedure to Meillassoux's philosophy, Harman 
claims that the infinite regress that the principle of sufficient reason leads to does not 
amount to an absurdity, since there is no contradiction involved in an infinite regress of 
sufficient reasons. It may be hard to visualize, Harman says, but that does not mean 
that it is absurd. For our part, what we will add to this is an exploration of the 
consequences of Harman's suggestion for Meillassoux's philosophy. 
Iain Hamilton Grant3 has stated that Meillassoux's critique of the principle of 
sufficient reason paradoxically satisfies it instead of refuting it. Grant then discusses the 
scope of this principle in relation to the problem of ground and to Schelling's 
philosophy. A similar approach of the principle of sufficient reason in relation to 
                                                          
2 Graham Harman, Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy in the Making. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2015, pp. 204-205. 
3 Iain Hamilton Grant. “Does Nature Stay What-it-is?: Dynamics and the Antecedence Criterion.” In The 
Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism, edited by Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and Graham 
Harman, 66-83. Melbourne: re.press, 2011. 
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Schelling's philosophy has been undertaken by Tyler Tritten4. 
Petter Hallward5 has questioned Meillassoux's discussion of the principle of 
sufficient reason, suggesting that Meillassoux confuses logical or metaphysical 
necessities with natural laws. Nathan Brown6 has responded to Hallward saying that 
Meillassoux is not guilty of such a confusion. 
It is also necessary to say that infinite regresses as such, and not just the infinite 
regress of sufficient reasons, has been studied by the proponents of infinitism. Authors 
such as Peter D. Klein7 and Scott F. Aikin8 have argued that not all infinite regresses 
lead to an absurdity. 
We are not committing ourselves to a reading of the principle of sufficient reason in 
relation to Schelling's philosophy here, nor are we committing ourselves to infinitism, 
or to the philosophies of Meillassoux's interpreters. We are only acknowledging that 
Meillassoux's critique of the principle of sufficient reason has been under discussion, 
and that the supposed absurdity of infinite regresses, without regards to Meillassoux in 
particular, has been challenged by the proponents of infinitism. 
MEILLASSOUX'S REJECTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT 
REASON 
Meillassoux argues that to think the extended substance in a Cartesian manner has 
become impossible since Kant. This is due to Kant's refutation of the ontological 
argument. For Descartes, the existence of the extended substance, together with its 
mathematizable qualities, depends on his demonstration of the existence of God. When 
Kant refutes the ontological argument used by Descartes, the existence of the extended 
substance can no longer be guaranteed by reasoning alone. 
According to Meillassoux, Descartes's thesis of the extended substance has three 
parts. He first demonstrates the existence of God. Then he proceeds to argue that a 
                                                          
4 Tyler Tritten, “After Contingency: Toward the Principle of Sufficient Reason as Post Factum” 
Symposium 19, 2015, pp. 24-38. 
5 Peter Hallward, “Anything is Possible: A Reading of Quentin Meillassoux's After Finitude.” In The 
Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism, edited by Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and Graham 
Harman, 130-141. Melbourne: re.press, 2011. 
6 Nathan Brown, “The Speculative and the Specific: On Hallward and Meillassoux.” In The Speculative 
Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism, edited by Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman, 142-
163. Melbourne: re.press, 2011. 
7 Peter D. Klein, “When Infinite Regresses are not Vicious”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3), 
2003, pp. 718-729. 
8 Scott F. Aikin, Epistemology and the Regress Problem. New York: Routledge, 2011. 
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perfect God cannot deceive us when we reason by means of clear and distinct ideas. 
Finally, since I have a clear and distinct idea of external objects, I conclude that these 
external objects must exist, since God cannot deceive me when I reason in this way. 
Let us examine this thesis in more detail. 
In the first part of the thesis, Descartes proves the existence of God by means of an 
argument that Kant later called “ontological argument”. This argument was 
formulated for the first time by Saint Anselm in the 11th Century in his Proslogion. For 
Saint Anselm, the fact that an imperfect and mortal being, such as a human being, is 
able to think perfection, necessarily demonstrates that there must be a perfect being. 
Because, according to Saint Anselm, an imperfect being could not have arrived by 
himself at the idea of perfection, unless a perfect being had somehow implanted this 
idea in the imperfect being who thinks it. This shows, he argues, that a perfect being 
must necessarily exist9. 
When Descartes uses this argument, he modifies it in some respects. Descartes says 
that the idea of a perfect being which lacks the attribute of existence cannot be a 
perfect being. The idea of a perfect being that does not exist is for Descartes a 
contradictory idea10. 
Meillassoux, following Kant, says that this would be analogous to the idea of a 
triangle which does not have three sides. If I think of a triangle, then it must necessarily 
have three sides. Similarly, if I think of a perfect being, then it must necessarily exist. 
Since I am able to think of a perfect being, this perfect being must exist, because 
existence is a necessary attribute of perfection. 
But Meillassoux also observes that even if Descartes were right in claiming that a 
perfect being must necessarily exist in order to be perfect, this does not necessarily 
mean that there is a contradiction involved in denying, at the same time, the concept of 
a perfect being and the supposed predicate of its existence. This is what Kant showed. 
If I think of a triangle and I deny its predicate, which says that it has three sides, then I 
incur in a contradiction. But if I deny the concept of a triangle, and at the same time I 
deny the predicate of its three sides, then I do not incur a contradiction, because since I 
have denied at the same time both the concept and the predicate of the same 
judgment, there is nothing left to contradict.  
Kant then concludes that existence cannot be a predicate. Existence cannot be 
compared with “having three sides” when we think of triangles. By saying that a 
                                                          
9 Anselm of Canterbury. “Proslogion”. In Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works. Edited with an 
Introduction by Brian Davies and G. R. Evans. Oxford University Press: Great Britan, 1998. 
10 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections from the Objections and Replies. Translated with 
an Introduction and Notes by Michael Moriarty. Oxford University Press: New York, 2008. 
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perfect being must exist, I am not really saying anything, because I cannot prove the 
existence of a being by concepts alone.  
Meillassoux claims that Kant's refutation of the ontological argument has much 
more vast consequences than the refutation of Descartes's proof of the existence of 
God. Strictly speaking, the Kantian refutation can be applied to any philosophical 
thesis that pretends to demonstrate the existence of an entity solely based on its 
concept. This includes, regrettably, realist or materialist metaphysics. I cannot 
demonstrate the existence of reality, of the world, the Universe, or matter, solely by 
virtue of concepts. If I say that the concept of reality necessarily includes existence 
within its predicate, then nothing impedes me from denying, in a Kantian way, both 
the concept and predicate of the judgment that I am formulating, without incurring in 
a contradiction.  
Then Meillassoux argues that the ontological argument is intimately related to the 
principle of sufficient reason, which Leibniz made explicit. According to this principle, 
every entity, situation, and fact has a sufficient reason for being what it is and the way it 
is, and not otherwise. This principle, Meillassoux says, demands that there be an 
ultimate and fundamental reason of all things. If I throw a rock, the sufficient reason 
for the falling of the rock is a physical law, precisely the law of gravity. But the principle 
of sufficient reason demands that there be a sufficient reason for the law of gravity. In 
other words, there must be a reason that accounts for the fact that there is a law of 
gravity instead of a law of “anti-gravity”, for example. There must be a sufficient reason 
that accounts for the fact that the Universe has these physical laws instead of others. 
And even if we discovered the sufficient reason in question, that “reason of physical 
laws”, the principle in question still demands that there be another sufficient reason to 
account for the “reason of physical laws”, and so on, without end. To avoid this infinite 
regress, there must be an ultimate reason of everything, a reason that would also 
include itself. This reason would not depend on another reason, it would only depend 
on itself. It provides itself with its own sufficient reason.  
And Meillassoux observes that this ultimate reason which includes itself is precisely 
what the ontological argument tries to uncover. Because a reason that contains within 
itself its own sufficient reason is equivalent to an entity whose existence is contained in 
its own essence. Therefore, in order to demonstrate its existence, it would be enough to 
deduce it from its concept. However, Kant's refutation of the ontological argument 
shows that there is no contradiction involved when we deny the concept of an ultimate 
reason that includes itself, since by denying at the same time concept and predicate 
alike, there is nothing left to contradict. Meillassoux concludes that since the principle 
of sufficient reason requires the ontological argument in order to avoid an infinite 
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regress, then by refuting the ontological argument we must also reject the principle of 
sufficient reason. Because without the ontological argument, the principle of sufficient 
reason would lead to an infinite regress. 
Meillassoux then proposes a new philosophical principle, which he calls “the 
principle of unreason”. According to this principle, there is no absolute necessity for 
entities to be the way they are, instead of being otherwise. Initially, it may seem that 
this principle is easy to accept. However, if we follow this principle to its ultimate 
consequences, then we are saying that an apple, for example, can become anything else 
from one moment to another, without any reason. It could become a cloud, or a 
person, or a mountain, without any reason to account for this radical change. Every 
entity in the Universe can become something radically different without any cause or 
reason, and none of these changes can be predicted or foreseen in any way. 
These reflections can be better understood by way of a concept which Meillassoux 
calls “hyper-Chaos”. He characterizes the hyper-Chaos as an omnipotent and lawless 
power, capable of destroying anything and everything, and also capable of bringing 
forth all kinds of entities and situations, even if they are absurd or even nightmarish. It 
may destroy even God, Becoming and Being. It may replace Becoming with a 
complete universal stasis. However, Meillassoux says that the only thing that the hyper-
Chaos cannot produce is a contradictory entity. He says that this must be so, because a 
contradictory entity would have no otherness, since it would be what it is and also what 
it is not, at the same time. Hence, Meillassoux argues that a contradictory entity would 
be incapable of changing, and if according to the principle of unreason every entity can 
radically change, then the possibility of there being entities which cannot change must 
be ruled out. Meillassoux thus rejects the principle of sufficient reason, while at the 
same time he upholds the principle of non-contradiction. 
THE REGRESSIST INFERENCE 
Let us now consider in more detail Meillassoux's claim that the infinite regress of 
sufficient reasons must be avoided. He says: 
 “If thought is to avoid an infinite regress while submitting to the principle of 
reason, it is incumbent upon it to uncover a reason that would prove capable of 
accounting for everything, including itself ”11 
The question that we raise at this point is: why should thought avoid an infinite regress 
                                                          
11 Quentin Meillassoux,  After finitude: An essay on the necessity of contingency. Trans. By Ray Brassier. London, 
Continuum, 2008, p. 33. 
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in the first place? It seems to us that Meillassoux accepts the following implicit answer: 
without the ontological argument, the infinite regress of sufficient reasons is absurd. It 
is this implicit assumption in his argumentation that we wish to question. In order to do 
so, we need to render this assumption explicit. We can reconstruct his implicit 
argument in the following way: 
1) The principle of sufficient reason leads to an infinite regress. 
2) The infinite regress in question leads to an absurdity and thus refutes the 
principle of sufficient reason, unless there a is a reason of everything, including 
itself. 
3) Only the ontological argument can uncover such a reason of all things. 
We will call this argument “regressist inference”. The reader will recognize that our 
reconstruction is similar to the one Meillassoux himself makes when he discusses the 
argument that he calls the “necessitarian inference”, in which he isolates one of its 
premises, which he calls “the frequentialist implication”. By refuting the frequentialist 
implication, Meillassoux refutes the necessitarian inference altogether. In an analogous 
fashion, we wish to focus our attention in the second proposition of the argument we 
have just reconstructed, in order to show that by refuting that proposition we can refute 
the argument altogether. 
In other words, we accept the first proposition of the argument in question. The 
principle of sufficient reason does indeed lead to an infinite regress. But we don't 
accept the second proposition. In order to see why, first we have to explicitly determine 
what the term “sufficient reason” means. It seems to us that the term “sufficient 
reason” can be understood either in an ontological sense or an epistemological sense. 
In the first case, a sufficient reason would be a physical cause or a physical law. In the 
second case, it would be a proposition that justifies another proposition. 
Let us consider first the case of sufficient reasons understood in an ontological 
sense, as a physical cause, and later as a physical law. As a physical cause, we can make 
a thought experiment based on Aristotle's doctrine of the four causes. As the reader 
will recall, Aristotle claimed that matter was eternal. But what must also be 
remembered is that the chain of efficient causes in Aristotle's philosophy is also eternal. 
This is because the Prime Mover is only formal cause and final cause, but it is not a 
material cause nor an efficient cause. 
As Giovanni Reale12 says, Aristotle's Prime Mover is the final cause of things in the 
same sense as the object of desire moves the lover, without being moved by the lover's 
desire. The Prime Mover, as First Cause, is not therefore an efficient cause. When 
                                                          
12 Giovanni Reale, Guía de lectura de la Metafísica de Aristóteles. Translated by J. M. López de Castro. 
Barcelona: Herder, 1999. 
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Aristotle says that the chain of efficient causes needs a cause in order to avoid an 
infinite regress, he is not saying that such a series needs an efficient first cause. Rather, 
the series of efficient causes requires a final cause in order to give it meaning, but 
understanding “meaning” here as purpose. If there was no final cause that gave purpose 
to the chain of efficient causes, then such a chain would be purposeless. And it is 
precisely this purposelessness what Aristotle cannot accept, since he thinks that a lack 
of purpose is absurd. He does not, however, think that the infinite chain of efficient 
causes is absurd just because it is infinite or without a beginning in time, since if he did, 
he would also have to claim that the eternal character of matter, which also lacks a 
beginning in time, would be just as absurd.  
Of course, nowadays we accept the idea that the Universe and time itself did have 
a beginning; with the Big Bang, precisely. Nonetheless, Aristotle's philosophy provides 
us with a valuable thought experiment for analyzing the claim that an infinite regress of 
sufficient causes is supposedly absurd by itself. Imagine a world such as the one 
described by Aristotle, where time itself had no beginning, where matter always existed 
and where the chain of efficient causes regresses to infinity. Imagine then, for example, 
a tree. That tree came from a seed, which in turn came from a previous tree, which 
was its progenitor. As such, one of the trees is the efficient cause of the other. And the 
progenitor tree itself came from another seed, which in turn came from a previous tree, 
and so on, to infinity. By Aristotle's own standards, there is nothing absurd about an 
infinite regress of efficient causes in this sense, the only absurdity according to him is to 
claim that this causal chain lacks purpose, that it is outside the reach of teleology. 
An objection to the preceding could be that such an example is inapplicable to our 
Universe, since trees have not always existed. Neither has matter or time itself. While 
this is true, what the previous example does show is that an infinite regress of efficient 
causes is not absurd by itself. In other words, there is nothing illogical about it. It 
cannot be said that an infinite regress of efficient causes is absurd by itself, since a 
world like Aristotle's is logically conceivable, and in that world the infinite regress of 
efficient causes does not require a first efficient cause, though it does require a final 
cause that endows the entire chain with purpose. But for the sake of argument, we may 
eliminate final causes and teleology altogether from our thought experiment, without 
affecting the conceivable character of an infinite regress of efficient causes. 
If Meillassoux's claim that thought ought to avoid an infinite regress of sufficient 
reasons is based on an ontological understanding of the term “sufficient reason”, then 
we can say that it is not necessary that thought should avoid such a regress, because we 
can logically conceive of a world, like Aristotle's, were it does not lead by itself to an 
absurdity. Even if this is conceded, it can still be objected that in our Universe at least, 
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an infinite regress of physical causes is indeed absurd, since at some point in the regress 
we arrive at the Big Bang, which we could naively characterize as a “First Cause”. But 
a crucial point must be acknowledged here: the infinite regress of physical causes, by 
itself, does not require that we postulate a First Cause, either in the form of Aristotle's 
Prime Mover, or in the manner of the Big Bang. If it did, then Meillassoux would be 
right in clamming that the infinite regress of sufficient reasons demands the uncovering 
of a First Reason. But we have seen that in the case of Aristotle's world this is not the 
case. When we say that in our Universe there can be no infinite regress of physical 
causes due to the fact that time began with the Big Bang, we must emphasize that this 
is due to a fact that we are already acknowledging as such, and not due to an inherent 
absurdity supposedly harbored by the idea of an infinite regress of physical causes as 
such. There is nothing in this infinite regress that logically necessitates by itself the 
uncovering of a first cause.  
We turn now to the other sense in which the term “sufficient reason” can be 
interpreted, the epistemological sense. Proponents of infinitism such as Scott F. Aikin 
and Peter D. Klein claim that the infinite regresses of propositions are not necessarily 
absurd, at least not all of them. As we have said before, we will not commit ourselves to 
infinitism here, we are simply acknowledge that the supposed absurdity of the infinite 
regress of propositions has been under discussion for some time. It will be enough for 
our purposes to resort to our previous thought experiment, in order to introduce 
another modification. Imagine once again a world were there is an infinite regress of 
physical laws. A person living in that world could say: “All trees are made of cells”. 
Suppose that there are microscopes in that world, and that a fragment of a tree can be 
observed under the microscope in order to corroborate that it is indeed composed of 
cells. Someone could then ask him: “Are cells the ultimate, indivisible components of 
things?” He would then answer: “No, they are not, because all cells are composed of 
molecules”. He could then add “And all molecules are composed of atoms”. Even more 
statements could be added: “All atoms are composed of quarks and other subatomic 
particles”, “All quarks and other subatomic particles are composed of even smaller 
particles”, “These even smaller particles are composed by even smaller particles”, and 
more statements of this sort, in that world, could be formulated without end. If it is 
objected that the person in question would at some point die, and that therefore he 
could not continue stating more propositions, we will reply that in principle more 
propositions could be added. Another person, from another generation, could keep 
adding them, and then another person from different generation could do so as well, 
and so on, without end. 
We turn now to Meillassoux's philosophy. By rejecting the second proposition from 
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the implicit argument that we reconstructed, we no longer need to accept the argument 
in question. Therefore, we have no need of accepting the ontological argument, since 
we have shown that the infinite regress of sufficient reasons, understood in an 
ontological or epistemological way, does not necessarily lead to an absurdity that would 
require the acceptance of the ontological argument. This means that we do not 
necessarily need to abandon the principle of sufficient reason.  
AN INFINITE REGRESS OF ORDERS OF FACTICITY 
Later in his book, Meillassoux renders the principle of unreason, which seems to be 
purely negative, into a positive principle, which he names “principle of factiality”. The 
principle of factiality states that everything is a fact, and that it is necessary that 
everything is a fact. This means that facticity is necessary, that “everything is a fact”, 
but this facticity is not itself a fact. Facticity has a non-factual essence, which 
Meillassoux calls “factiality”. Everything is a fact, but it is not a fact that everything is a 
fact, it is a necessity. We began by examining the principle of unreason, which was later 
turned into the the concept of the hyper-Chaos. Now this has been turned this into the 
principle of factiality. 
The rehabilitation of the principle of sufficient reason has a consequence which 
pertains to Meillassoux's idea that an infinite regress of orders of facticity should be 
avoided in the same manner as thought should avoid an infinite regress of sufficient 
reasons. He says: 
 “When I claim that the facticity of things (first-order facticity) is a fact, I also 
assume that the facticity of facticity (second-order facticity) can be thought as an 
absolute. But then I become caught in an infinite regress, for if I claim that 
second-order facticity is also a fact, I can only do so by assuming that there is a 
third-order facticity which is itself absolute, and so on. In other words, the act of 
doubting the necessity of facticity is self-refuting, because it assumes an 
absoluteness of facticity in the act of thinking while simultaneously denying it in 
the content of this same thought.”13 
Considering the preceding discussion on the infinite regress of sufficient reasons, 
we think that a similar line of reasoning can be employed in order to show that the 
infinite regress of orders of facticity must not necessarily be avoided, since this other 
kind of infinite regress does not amount to an absurdity either. I can doubt the 
necessity of facticity based on the facticity of facticity (second-order facticity), instead of 
                                                          
13 Quentin Meillassoux, After finitude: An essay on the necessity of contingency. Trans. By Ray Brassier. London, 
Continuum, 2008, p. 74. 
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doubting the necessity of first-order facticity while recognizing that necessity in the 
content of the thought of first-order facticity. In other words, I don't need to assume 
that facticity is absolute, because I can de-absolutize the first-order facticity by means 
of an absolutization of a different order of facticity, a second-order facticity. And then I 
can think of the de-absolutization of this second-order facticity by means of the 
absolutization of a third-order facticity, which is de-absolutized by a fourth-order 
facticity, and so on. Meillassoux thinks that this possibility is illegitimate, but only 
because he assumes that the regressist inference is valid. Since the regressist inference is 
not valid, there is nothing illegitimate or absurd about an infinite regress of orders of 
facticity. 
Each one of these orders of facticity turns the previous one into a fact. From this 
perspective, the infinite regress of orders of facticity is the infinite regress of facts. In the 
same sense in that there is no First Cause or Prime Mover or a final reason, neither is 
there an “ultimate facticity” that would be absolute. If this is so, then the hyper-Chaos 
would cease to be an absolute, and it would be a fact instead. More precisely, it would 
be a hyper-Chaos only with regards to a second-order hyper-Chaos, and this one with 
reference to a third-order hyper-Chaos, and so on. We would have then an infinite 
regress of different orders of chaotic facts.  
Since the infinite regress of different orders of hyper-Chaos renders each one of 
them into a fact, then it can be legitimately asked if were are not thinking instead of a 
hyper-Cosmos. An extreme form of Cosmos, where every physical law is grounded by 
another physical law, and so on, without end. We are not saying that such a hyper-
Cosmos actually exists. That would be excessively bold, and imprudent. What we are 
saying is that the idea of an infinite regress of chaotic facts can be thought as the 
infinite regress of different physical laws. In accordance, things would be what they are 
due to a physical law, and this physical law would be what it is, and the way it is, due to 
another physical law, and so on. Maybe there is no such hyper-Cosmos, but the idea of 
it seems to supplant the idea of the hyper-Chaos, once it is granted that this last idea 
can legitimately be thought as a fact, instead of an absolute. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
From the preceding, we can draw the following conclusions: Meillassoux's work 
suggests the possibility of proceeding in a way that could be characterized, 
metaphorically, as “non-euclidean”, in the sense that one assumes a certain anti-
intuitive postulate in order to see if a contradiction is deduced from it. He specifically 
suggests this for the idea that causality is not necessary, but we believe that his “non-
euclidean” suggestion may be applied to any postulate in general. For our part, we 
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have used this approach in order to see if we could deduce a contradiction from the 
assumption that the infinite regress of sufficient reasons does not invalidate the 
principle in question. We did not arrive at a contradiction; instead we argued that since 
the infinite regress of sufficient reasons does not lead to an absurdity, then we have no 
need of abandoning the principle of sufficient reason. We do not need to embrace the 
ontological argument either, nor do we need to accept the principle of unreason or 
factiality. Lastly, we have argued that there is no absurdity in the idea of an infinite 
regress of orders of facticity. This means that we can de-absolutize every order of 
facticity based on a different order of facticity, without end, which suggests that 
facticity is not absolute. If so, then Meillassoux's hyper-Chaos can be more adequately 
thought as a hyper-Cosmos. 
Argentina 
martin7600@gmail.com 
 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Aikin, Scott F. Epistemology and the Regress Problem. New York: Routledge, 2011. 
Anselm of Canterbury. “Proslogion”. In Anselm of  Canterbury: The Major Works. Edited 
with an Introduction by Brian Davies and G. R. Evans. Oxford University 
Press: Great Britan, 1998. 
Brown, Nathan. “The Speculative and the Specific: On Hallward and Meillassoux.” In 
The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism, edited by Levi Bryant, 
Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman, 142-163. Melbourne: re.press, 2011. 
Descartes, René. Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections from the Objections and 
Replies. Translated with an Introduction and Notes by Michael Moriarty. 
Oxford University Press: New York, 2008. 
Grant, Iain Hamilton. “Does Nature Stay What-it-is?: Dynamics and the Antecedence 
Criterion.” In The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism, edited by 
Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman, 66-83. Melbourne: re.press, 
2011. 
Hallward, Peter. “Anything is Possible: A Reading of Quentin Meillassoux's After 
 MARTIN ORENSANZ 275 
Finitude.” In The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism, edited by 
Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman, 130-141. Melbourne: re.press, 
2011. 
Harman, Graham. Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy in the Making. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2015. 
Klein, Peter D. “When Infinite Regresses are not Vicious”, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 66 (3), 2003, pp. 718-729. 
Meillassoux, Quentin. After finitude: An essay on the necessity of  contingency. Trans. By Ray 
Brassier. London, Continuum, 2008. 
Reale, Giovanni, Guía de lectura de la Metafísica de Aristóteles. Translated by J. M. López de 
Castro. Barcelona: Herder, 1999. 
Tritten, Tyler. “After Contingency: Toward the Principle of Sufficient Reason as Post 
Factum” Symposium 19, 2015, pp. 24-38. 
 
 
